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Abstract 
 
We introduce an agent-based model, in which agents set their prices to maximize profit. At 
steady state the market self-organizes into three groups: excess producers, consumers and 
balanced agents, with prices determined by their own resource level and a couple of macroscopic 
parameters that emerge naturally from the analysis, akin to mean-field parameters in statistical 
mechanics. When resources are scarce prices rise sharply below a turning point that marks the 
disappearance of excess producers. To compare the model with real empirical data, we study the 
relations between commodity prices and stock-to-use ratios of a range of commodities such as 
agricultural products and metals. By introducing an elasticity parameter to mitigate noise and 
long-term changes in commodities data, we confirm the trend of rising prices, provide evidence 
for turning points, and indicate yield points for less essential commodities.  
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Introduction 
The oil price crisis of 1973 rattled the world and left persistent effects on the world 
economy and politics [1]. Peak periods in food price index during 2008 and 2011 coincided with 
incidents of food riots and instabilities across the world [2]. Clearly, prices of commodities affect 
our lives in many ways; they determine the economic well-being of individuals, companies, 
societies and the stability of governments. Besides the immediate effects on the livelihood of the 
average citizen, farmers need to know the prices of crops for planning their land use, 
manufacturers need to know when to import their raw materials, policy-makers need to decide on 
their agricultural stabilization schemes, and speculators would like to make a fortune in the 
futures market. Correlations exist between stock level and prices [3], and were illustrated by the 
2008 hike in grain price due to the diversion of corn to biofuel production [4]. When stocks 
decline to dangerous levels, prices become highly sensitive to small perturbations. 
Since factors affecting commodity prices are complex, most analyses are based on 
empirical fitting, such as power-law relations between price and stock level [5]. However, few 
models are based on fundamental principles that relate prices to the microscopic composition of 
markets [6]. The effect of changes in market structure on prices was illustrated by the famous 
Lewis Model describing the labor market in developing economies, in which wages rise due to 
shortage in low-cost labor [7], as has been experienced in China recently [8].  
In this work we devise an agent-based model to better understand how market structure 
drives prices. It has the advantage of capturing the most essential elements of market structure 
that affects commodity prices. Its amenability to quantitative analysis enables us to vary the 
macroscopic parameters of the market and identify different regimes of market structure. The 
composition of the agent population in each regime is different, yielding regimes of inelastic and 
elastic price behaviors. This indicates that the empirical fitting of price trends in different price 
regimes by a single function is not sufficient. 
To verify the prediction of our model, we further study empirical data of commodity 
stocks and prices. Although such data trends are often obscured by noises, we significantly 
improve the quality of the data using regressions of an elasticity parameter. As a result, we are 
able to reveal the existence of turning points from inelastic to elastic regimes in some 
commodities in agreement with our model. Furthermore, we discover from the data the existence 
of yield regimes in some commodities. 
In a nutshell, the success of our model is due to the inclusion of the following 
components. First, it identifies the uneven distribution of resource as an important component of 
the model and a major driver of price changes.  This determines the market structure composed 
of agents with different capacities playing different roles in the market as excess producers, 
balanced agents or consumers. They set prices differently in the market since microscopically the 
bargaining power of the agents depends on supply and demand. In a sufficiently well-connected 
market sellers with more abundant supply may set lower prices so as to capture a larger market 
share and buyers with a strong demand may accommodate higher prices to secure commodity 
provision. 
The second component of the model is market interaction. With the recent application of 
social network theory to economics [9], the bargaining power of the agents was found to depend 
on the topology of the corresponding trading networks, which determines the competition 
relation between suppliers and consumers [10], giving rise to price variations at equilibrium [11]. 
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Furthermore, such interactions can lead to Nash equilibrium states that maximize the utility of 
agents [12]. This process of attaining a global stationary state through local responses to 
neighboring interactions can be considered a graphical game [13], implemented through passing 
messages between neighbors, like those in network optimization and inference [14].  
The formalism of our model can be applied to networks with different topologies but in 
this paper we focus on fully connected networks, representing markets in which agents can freely 
trade among themselves. In this setting, the many-body effects of the agents’ own pricing 
decisions are diluted, enabling us to describe the market state by only a few macroscopic 
parameters, resembling mean-field approaches in statistical physics. We can then monitor 
changes in price trends in different regimes and see whether price changes resemble phase 
transitions in many-body interacting systems [15]. 
The third component of the model is the role played by inventory in shaping the 
transition between the different regimes. Inventory increases the demand of the agents in a soft 
way that smooths out sharp transitions of prices, enabling our model to reveal the elastic price 
regime that would be otherwise masked by neglecting inventory effects. Here inventory carries a 
different meaning from stocks. Stocks refer to the excess amount of commodities left behind in 
the hands of the agents when their production plus inflow exceeds outflow. On the other hand, 
low levels of inventory are necessary for all agents to maintain a smooth operation of the system 
[16]. For example, industrialists need to keep an inventory of raw materials so as to streamline 
their manufacturing process. Dealers need to keep an inventory to facilitate sales and deliveries 
to anticipate sporadic transactions, and occasionally they are forced to carry inventories when 
faced with low seasons of sale. While inventory levels are low, they act as buffers to smooth 
sharp changes in supply and demand, and represent the level of commodity agents keep to avoid 
running out of stock when purchasing orders arrive. 
 
Results  
Model 
We consider a network of N nodes. Each node i is connected to a set of trading partners 
denoted as i. Unless stated otherwise, we will consider fully connected networks in this work 
where i consists of all nodes except i. Each node is either a producer or a consumer of a 
commodity, with an initial capacity i randomly drawn from a distribution (i) for node i = 1, . 
. . , N. Positive i represents the amount of commodity produced per unit time by node i, 
whereas negative i represents the amount of commodity consumed per unit time by node i. The 
commodity is essential to all consumers, so that each consumer has to purchase a sufficient 
amount of commodity to satisfy their needs, and each producer cannot sell more commodity than 
its capacity. This is possible globally if the average  of the distribution () is positive. Let yij 
be the flow of commodity from node j to i. We adopt the convention that negative yij means a 
flow of magnitude |yij| in the opposite direction. Hence the inequality j∈i yij +i ≥ 0 applies to 
each node i. The flows yij associated with a producer (consumer) i with a largely positive 
(negative) capacity are all outgoing (incoming), while the flows associated with a node with 
intermediate capacity may be partly outgoing and partly incoming, corresponding to their role as 
middle-men besides providing or consuming their own resources. 
The net demand raised by node i to other nodes is the outflow minus the capacity if the 
difference is positive and 0 otherwise, given by max(j∈i yji  i, 0). When the argument j∈i yji 
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 i changes sign, the demand has a discontinuous slope. In practice, trading nodes need to keep 
a provisional level of commodity so that they do not run out of stock when purchasing order 
arrives. Hence we propose a smoother demand i 
 
 ,iij jii yf            (1) 
 
where f(x) is an inventory-dependent function with a continuous slope, and asymptotically 
approaches 0 and x, respectively, in the limits x → ∓∞. For convenience, we use f(x) = v ln 
[1+exp (x/v)], where v is referred to as the inventory level, but other functions may also be 
considered. The original demand function with a discontinuous slope at zero demand is 
recovered in the limit v→0. On the other hand, for finite values of v, f(x) starts to deviate 
smoothly from 0 when x is of the same order as v. The inventory has the same effect as a 
fluctuating capacity i + zi, where zi is drawn from the distribution P(zi) = sech
2
(zi/4v)/4v. 
To satisfy the demand i, node i purchases commodity from other nodes. Let rij be the 
fraction purchased from node j by node i, so that the amount of commodity shipped from j to i is 
yij = irij. The fractions are determined by the prices set by neighboring nodes k ∈ i on a 
competitive basis. We consider fractions of the form  
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where j is the price set by node j, and F() is a non-negative decreasing function of . For 
convenience, we use the exponential form F() = exp(−), where  is a parameter playing the 
role of inverse temperature in the statistical physics literature, but other forms are also possible. 
When  → ∞, rij becomes a winner-take-all function, such that the node with the lowest price 
becomes the sole provider of node i. In reality, agents diversify their purchases due to many 
factors. For example, they may have considerations other than prices such as quality and service,  
they may not like to be monopolized, or the cheapest choice may not be available at their 
moment of need. We note that −1 is the scale of the price. This means that when the prices set 
by two suppliers differ by less than −1, the buyer would purchase from both suppliers with 
roughly equal weight. However, when the price difference becomes much greater the purchasing 
amount will differ significantly. Hence −1 can be considered as the intrinsic value of a unit of 
commodity. For convenience, we will take  =1, so that prices are scaled in units of the intrinsic 
value.  
Each node i calculates its price i by minimizing its net cost Ei, which is the purchasing 
cost minus the sales revenue, assuming that the price of other nodes are not changed. Hence 
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The clearing and price adjustment process of this trading model with and without inventory can 
be simulated in the way described in the Supporting Materials (SM). 
 
Predictions 
 
To minimize Ei, node (trader) i needs to assess the effects of changing its price by i. 
Obviously, the sales revenue changes since the price of every unit of sold commodity changes. In 
addition, node i needs to know how its trading partners respond to the price change, specifically 
the flow change yji in response to i. It may obtain this knowledge through an active 
bargaining process, or through the passive observation of how the sales volume changes with 
price. Node i will then consider such messages from all neighbors before establishing its new 
price. In this respect, this trading network model belongs to the class of network problems 
solvable by passing messages [14]. The message sent from node j to i through the bargaining 
process is 
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Since the export of node i changes, the demand i  in the purchasing cost also changes. Using Eq. 
(1), we have 
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For the term ∂ξj/∂ϕi in Eq. (4), we need to consider how a price change i at node i induces 
changes in demands of all nodes, assuming that prices at other nodes are unchanged. However, 
the demand changes are interdependent. j induces changes in the neighbors of j, which induces 
changes back in j, commonly referred to as Onsager reactions in many-body physics. As 
shown in the SM for fully connected networks using Green’s function techniques, j is of the 
order N
−1
 of i for nodes j neighboring node i. Hence the second term in Eq. (4) can be 
neglected in the large N limit. After collecting messages from all neighbors, the price becomes 
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When the network is fully connected, the price behavior depends on only two macroscopic 
parameters: p ≡ e
-/e- being the average purchasing price and y ≡/e- termed the 
demand coefficient, where the outflow from a node to satisfy the network’s demand is ye-. 
Averages denoted by the angled brackets are taken over all nodes. The price  of a node becomes 
a unique function of its capacity , bounded between the maximum price 1+p and minimum 
price 1. () is the inverse function of 
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We first consider the limit of zero inventory. When v→0 the price at node i depends on its 
capacity i as 
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Hence there are three types of nodes. (1) Consumers (i < ye
−1−p
) with positive demands and 
price 1+p. (2) Balanced agents (ye
−1−p  i  ye
−1
) with zero demands and no excess resources. 
Their prices are ln(y/i). (3) Excess producers (i >ye
−1
) with zero demands and excess 
resources and price 1. 
With the inventory effect, price becomes a continuously changing function, as shown in 
Fig. 1(A). The three groups of nodes can still be identified, although the boundaries become 
fuzzy. Due to the presence of inventory, the outflows of the balanced nodes differ from their 
capacities by an amount of order v. For balanced agents with ye
−1−p
  i  ye
−1−p/2
, the outflow is 
greater than the capacity by an amount of order v, whereas for balanced agents with ye
−1−p/2  i 
 ye
−1
, the outflow is less than the capacity by an amount of the order v. These two groups will be 
referred to as quasi consumers and quasi producers respectively. 
 
Fig. 1. Price predictions of the model. (A) The dependence of price on the node capacity. Red curve: Eq. (7) for 
 = 0.2 and v = 0.01. Black curve: v = 0 limit. (B) The dependence of purchasing price on average capacity (solid 
blue line). Pink dashed line: price in the regime with excess producers. Brown symbol: Disappearance of excess 
producers. Turquoise dot: Disappearance of quasi producers. Brown dotted line: asymptotic limit of vanishing 
capacity. Inset: The dependence of the capacity elasticity of price on the average capacity in the v = 0 limit. 
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Solutions of the self-consistent equations for p and y depend on the resource distribution 
(). Considering the bounded resource production and consumption in real data we adopt 
distributions with upper and lower bounds. The expressions of p and y in the limit of small v are 
derived in the SM for the rectangular distribution of mean  and width 1. 
For the rectangular capacity distribution with v = 0, the dependence of price and cost on 
capacity is verified by simulations shown in Figs. 2(A) and (B) respectively. In both figures, the 
theoretical results (dashed lines) are in excellent agreement with those obtained by solving the 
Nash equilibrium equations (6). As expected, the cost increases with decreasing capacity. It is 
interesting to note that through trading at an optimal price, even the consumers with i close to 0 
can gain profit (negative cost). 
Fig. 2. Model verification by simulations. The price distribution (A) and the cost distribution (B) for different 
agent capacities with  = 0.01, v = 0, N = 100, 1,000 samples, 10,000 time steps and 200 updating cycles per time 
step. Dashed curves: predictions by Eq. (7). Both distributions are in natural log scale. 
 
When resources become increasingly tight, the purchasing price increases, as shown in 
Fig. S2 of SM. For the rectangular capacity distribution, p approaches the finite value of 1.83 
with an infinite slope when  approaches 0. When  falls below 0, the price diverges 
discontinuously. Note that excess producers exist in the range ( 2/1 −  )2 ≤  ≤ 1/2 + ,  
showing that the fraction of excess producers approaches 0 when  approaches 0. However, for 
finite values of , excess producers always exist in the case of zero inventory v = 0. 
When v has a small non-zero value, the price discontinuity for v = 0 is smeared out to 
give a more refined picture in the range  ∼ v as shown in Fig. 1(B). First, we find that when 
 is in the range 0.622v ≤   ≪ 1, the average price remains effectively at 1.83. This is the 
inelastic regime, and the market structure consists of excess producers, balanced agents and 
consumers. 
When  falls below 0.622v, excess producers disappear, and the price rises above 1.83 
(brown symbol in Fig. 1(B)). This is the elastic regime and the market structure consists of only 
the balanced agents and the consumers. The rise in price shows that in this regime, the excess 
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producers can no longer play the role of stabilizing the price by acting as a reservoir of resources. 
However, although resource production is still above consumption for  > 0, the holding up of 
resources in inventories causes the excess resources of the excess producers to dry up. The price 
thus experiences a sharp turning point. This turning point resembles a phase transition in many 
physical systems. Hence when /v falls below the turning point, the purchasing price turns 
from flat to rapidly rising. However, the turning point is sharp only in the limit of vanishing v. 
For finite values of v, the change is smoother. The inset of Fig. 1(b) shows that the capacity 
elasticity of price, −vdp/d, has a discontinuous slope at /v = 0.622, resembling a phase 
transition in many physical systems. Figure 3(A) shows the analytical result that prices rise 
rapidly when /v falls below 0.622, accompanied by the disappearance of excess producers, 
and confirmed by simulation results in Fig. 3(B). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Prices rise rapidly when the average capacity falls below the turning point. (A) The analytical result of 
the capacity dependence of the prices at different inventory levels at v = 0.01. (B) The corresponding simulation 
results. 
 
When  falls further below 0.171v, and the price rises to 3.67, even the quasi producers 
disappear (turquoise dot in Fig. 1(B)). However, since the excess resources held by the quasi 
producers are of the order v, the effect on the price behavior is much less pronounced. In this 
regime, the price rises with decreasing  asymptotically as 0.496v/, and diverges when 
/v approaches 0. Figure 3(A) shows the analytical result of the capacity dependence of the 
prices at different inventory levels. The prices rise rapidly when /v falls below 0.622. 
Simulation results in Fig. 3(B) confirm the trend. The results also have an excellent agreement 
with those obtained by solving the Nash equilibrium equations (6). 
In practice, most commodities are only considered essential when prices are not too high 
or stocks are sufficient. When prices become too high or stocks too low, the market will no 
longer consider the commodity essential. Buyers may switch to alternative commodities or at 
least refrain from purchasing. In the SM we consider a scenario whereby sales price reaches a 
maximum when the capital of agents is finite. We term this point the yield point. 
 
Comparison with Data 
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To compare with commodities data, a common parameter to measure resource 
availability in commodity markets is the stocks-to-use ratio (SUR) defined as the amount of 
carryover stock of a commodity at the end of a period (usually a year) divided by the 
consumption during the same period [17]. While conventionally SUR is expressed as a 
percentage, it has the dimension of time, representing the duration in which stocks will be 
consumed by the market (assuming that no other resources are available). SUR is an important 
predictive tool of commodity prices [18]. For example, there is a strong negative correlation 
between cotton prices and SUR [19]. Similar trends were also observed in wheat and corn prices 
[5]. 
In general, a plot of the price of a commodity as a function of the SUR appears as a 
collection of scattered points, although a rough trend is often visible. One factor is that the data is 
gathered over many years or even decades, such that the data is interfered by many other factors, 
for instance changes in market needs. Here, we propose that the quality of data can be improved 
by defining the SUR elasticity of price, 
.
SURin  change
pricein  change
pE         (9) 
In practice, we calculate the yearly elasticity of the commodities, and sort the corresponding 
SUR in order. Approximately 10 data points with consecutive SUR values are clustered for 
regression, and the slope of the cluster is taken to be the elasticity corresponding to the value of 
SUR averaged over the cluster. To compare with the theoretical prediction, the rescaling of the 
elasticity and SUR are explained in SM and plotted. Remarkably, a much clearer picture often 
emerges from this analysis. 
For agricultural products in the U.S. market [20], Figs. 4(A)-(C) show the SUR 
dependence of the elasticity for long-grain rice, short-grain rice, cotton, and soybeans. The 
elasticities of these commodities have the common feature that they increase with decreasing 
SUR. We have also considered the data of other agricultural products. However, commodities 
such as honey and peanuts do not exhibit the behavior predicted by the trading model. This may 
be an indication that they are not essential and market demand would shrink if prices are too 
high. 
Figure 4(D) is the composite plot of the four agricultural products illustrating their 
universal behavior. The plot is consistent with the prediction of our model showing that the 
elasticity increases with decreasing SUR. It is noted that the data can probably be fitted also be 
fitted with curves that continuously decrease with increasing SUR, such as in [5]. To provide a 
perspective on this point, it may be argued that the world economy has adjusted itself to the state 
of a low level of SUR, such that spare capacity is converted to other more efficient and profitable 
use of resources, rendering the turning point unobservable. 
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Fig. 4. Elasticity of agricultural products. The rescaled elasticity versus the rescaled SUR for (A) long-grain rice 
and short-grain rice 1983-2011, (B) cotton 1965-2010, (C) soybeans 1980-2012. The elasticities and the SURs are 
respectively rescaled by (A) 4.72 $@1998/cwt/y and 0.385 y for long-grain rice, and 1.86 $@1998/cwt/y and 0.830 
y for short-grain rice, (B) 14.7 cents@1998/lb/y and 0.906 y, (C) 2.18 $@1998/bu/y and 0.474 y. Each plotted point 
comes from a regression of 13 data points. (D) The composite plot of the four agricultural products. Solid curves: 
the pricing model. 
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Fig. 5. Elasticity of metals. The rescaled elasticity versus the rescaled SUR for (A) sulfur 1928-2015, (B) gallium 
1971-2015, (C) manganese 1949-2015, (D) silicon 1964-2015, (E) copper 1900-2015, (F) molybdenum 1941-2015, 
(G) aluminum 1949-2015, (H) beryllium 1941-2015. The elasticities and the SURs are respectively rescaled by (A) 
2,900 $@1998/t/y and 0.0387 y, (B) 632,705 $@1998/t/y and 0.156 y, (C) 128 $@1998/t/y and 3.633 y, (D) 2,801 
$@1998/t/y and 0.174 y, (E) 497 $@1998/t/y and 0.719 y, (F) 43,694 $@1998/t/y and 0.810 y, (G) 1,070 
$@1998/t/y and 1.333 y, (H) 152,406 $@1998/t/y and 2.012 y. Each plotted point comes from a regression of 13 
data points. Solid curves: the pricing model. 
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For metal prices [21], Figs. 5(A)-(B) show that the elasticities of sulfur and gallium 
exhibit a flat regime when SUR is high and rise when SUR falls below a point, agreeing with our 
model in the existence of turning points. On the other hand, Figs. 5(C)-(H) show that the 
elasticities of some other metals also has a flat and rising regime, but they increase only up to a 
yield point as SUR decreases. Below that point the elasticity either decreases with decreasing 
SUR or becomes broadly distributed, and even negative elasticities are observed. 
 
The data at the turning points and yield points of these metals are shown in Table 1. It is 
interesting to note that despite the wide range of commodities, the SURs of most commodities at 
the turning points typically lie in the range 0.1 to 2.3 y, and their SURs at the yield points 
typically lie in the range 0.07 to 1.2 y. The SURs of gallium and sulfur are below 0.1 y at the 
turning points and the yield points are not observable from the data. To understand the typical 
value of the yield elasticity, we introduce the relative yield elasticity, defined as the elasticity at 
the yield point divided by the typical price of the commodity per unit of SUR at the yield point. 
The typical price of the commodity is calculated to be the average price in the elastic regime 
(between the turning and yield points). We find that the relative yield elasticity is in the range 0.1 
to 1. It is plausible that the market mechanism determining the price of these commodities is 
rather universal. 
We have also considered the data of other metals such as lead and nickel. They do not 
admit the behavior predicted by the pricing model, indicating that their prices may be affected by 
factors other than supply and demand. 
 
Commodity 
SUR at 
turning 
point 
(year) 
SUR at 
yield point 
(year) 
Relative 
yield 
elasticity 
Aluminum 0.830 0.605 0.488 
Beryllium 1.252 0.995 0.289 
Copper 0.447 0.290 0.154 
Manganese 2.261 1.223 1.053 
Molybdenum 0.504 0.339 0.500 
Silicon 0.108 0.070 0.402 
 
Table 1. SUR at the turning and yield points and the relative yield elasticity for six metals. 
In summary, the plots reveal an increasing elasticity with decreasing SUR before 
reaching the yield point if any. There exist turning points and yield points, separating the price 
behaviors into inelastic, elastic and yielded regimes. Most agricultural commodities 
predominantly cover the elastic regime. Data of other commodities such as cereal [22], crude oil 
[23, 24] and carbon trading [25, 26] have similar behaviors and are presented in the SM. On the 
other hand, less essential commodities such as metals have both turning points and yield points. 
 
Conclusion  
To understand how market structure drives commodity prices, we have proposed an 
agent-based model in which agents set their prices to maximize profits or minimize costs. The 
model is analytically solvable in a fully connected network, and the market behavior depends on 
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only two mean-field parameters: the purchasing price p and the demand coefficient y. The price 
behaviors in the different regimes can be attributed to the following ingredients of the model. (1) 
Resource is unevenly distributed and bounded among the agents. (2) Agents determine their 
prices through interactions, causing the market to self-organize into three types of agents 
depending on their capacities. Among them, the excess producers have excess resources and set 
their prices at the intrinsic value of the commodity. They act as a buffer for price stability. (3) 
The inclusion of inventory of individual agents smears out the sharp divergence of price to a 
turning point from the inelastic regime to the elastic one when the average capacity becomes 
comparable to the inventory level. This is in contrast to the model with no inventory, where the 
price jumps discontinuously to infinity when the systemwide resource vanishes. The transition at 
the turning point is due to a change in the market structure when excess resources are exhausted, 
and the market loses the buffering provided by excess producers. This mechanism is reminiscent 
of the Lewisian turning point, which describes the rise in wages of unskilled labor in developing 
economies when the labor market starts to run out of unskilled labor [7]. When the average 
resource is reduced further, the commodities become too expensive and the price rise may be 
restrained below the yield point.  
To verify the model, we have analyzed the price history of agricultural products, metals 
and other commodities. We found that: (1) Elasticity versus SUR plots are much more 
interpretable than price versus SUR. This is probably because elasticity is based on short-term 
price changes, whereas a good plot of price versus SUR requires the long-term independence of 
the environment. (2) The elasticity versus SUR plot reveals two critical points: turning point and 
yield point. Three regimes are identified on decreasing SUR: inelastic, elastic and yielded. (3) 
Different data types have different characteristics. Only non-essential commodities have yield 
points. Most agricultural commodities cover the elastic regime only. Yielded regimes are present 
in most metals. (4) The data support the insights gained from our model. 
We note that the price trends and the existence of the turning point are insensitive to 
details of the proposed model. Purchasing fractions other than the exponential function in Eq. (2) 
can be used, as long as they short-ranged functions of the price. Capacity distributions, other than 
the rectangular one, also exhibit similar behaviors as long as they have an upper bound. Similar 
predictions are also applicable to networks whose nodes have high but finite connectivity. 
Since the commodities considered are storable, a natural extension of this study is to 
consider additional market demand for future consumption, and additional market supply from 
storing excess past production. Agents with this awareness tend to “buy low, sell high”, thus 
providing an arbitrage mechanism on the commodity price. Indeed, a demand curve as a function 
of price was proposed with an additional component due to this storage demand when the price 
falls below a threshold [4]. Since the present study mainly pertains to the case of tight market 
supply and high prices, the effects of storage demand are neglected. Moreover, since storage 
introduces another variable to the model, the flexibility of the model may obscure the insight 
gained while offering limited benefit. A possible extension of this study is to consider the 
situation where the market supply fluctuates strongly in time, and agents adapt to the 
environment by adopting storage policies [3]. This problem can be approached by considering 
agents undertaking reinforcement learning [27], constituting an interesting future study.  
The pricing model can be applied to prediction of prices in commodity markets. The 
wealth of generic results we have described in fully-connected networks can be generalized to 
other network structures after appropriate modifications to study specific features. Considering 
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the finite connections of trading partners, we may consider networks with low connectivity. In 
such networks, the Onsager reactions of the pricing decisions will become significant, and it will 
be interesting to explore the effects of connectivity on the price and profit distributions. Another 
case of interest is geographical networks, in which interactions with neighbors depend on 
geographical distance, and regional dependence of prices and profits is likely to emerge. 
Extending the model to scale-free networks [28], we will be able to study the role played by hubs 
and satellites in distributing resources and gaining profits. By coupling the commodity network 
with another layer of network such as the financial network or the futures market network, we 
will be able to adopt the inter-dependent network approach [29] to consider broader issues of 
market stability. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Design of the Simulation Experiment 
The clearing and price adjustment process of this trading model without inventory can be 
simulated in the following way: Each time step is divided into a large number of updating cycles. 
At the beginning of each time step, the position of each node, i.e., its net surplus (demand), and 
the transaction cost Ei(t) of node i are initialized to 0. 
Initialization: At the beginning of each updating cycle, the position of node i is increased 
(decreased) by i. The total number of purchasing orders during that cycle is the total number of 
negative positions of the consumers after rounding to the nearest integer. 
Purchasing orders: A purchasing order is randomly chosen, and the buyer i initiating the 
purchasing order is noted. A seller j is selected with probability rij. 
Trading: If the position of node j is positive after rounding, the transaction is successful and the 
positions of i and j are raised and lowered by 1 respectively. Otherwise, node j will act as a trader 
and randomly selects seller k with the probability rjk. (In our formulation, node i is not excluded.) 
If the position of node k is positive after rounding, then the transactions between i and j and 
between j and k are both successful and the positions of i and k are updated. Otherwise, node k 
will act as a trader and continues to search for a potential supplier until the chain of transactions 
can be carried out. In the rest of the cycle, other buyers are randomly chosen until the positions 
of all nodes become non-negative after rounding. The cycles are repeated so that the transaction 
costs can be better estimated. At the end of the time step, the price i(t+1) is updated according 
to the current correlation between cost and price i(t + 1) = i(t)  wi(t)sgn{[i(t)  i(t  
1)][Ei(t)  Ei(t  1)]}, where  is the adjustment rate, and wi(t) is a random number between 0 
and 1 representing the stochastic nature of the pricing process. 
 To simulate the case of non-vanishing inventory level, the simulation is done 
analogously, except that: (1) the demands di(t), dynamical dummy variables akin to the demands 
i, are initialized to 0 at the beginning of each time step; (2) the position of node i is incremented 
by i  vln{1 + exp[|di(t)|/v]} at the beginning of each updating cycle, reflecting its demands 
and inventory requirements; (3) the total number of purchasing orders during an updating cycle 
is the minimum of two numbers: the total number of negative positions of the consumers after 
rounding, or the total number of positive positions of the suppliers after rounding; and (4) the 
demand is updated according to  )()()()1( buy tdtntdtd iiiii   , where  is the 
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adjustment rate, and )(buy tni  is the average number of purchasing orders received by node i per 
updating cycle (irrespective of whether the transaction is successful or not), reflecting the change 
in demand given the activities of the previous time step. 
Statistical Analysis 
Simulations in Figs. 2(A-B) were done with N = 100, 1,000 samples and  = 0.01. Both 
distributions were obtained after 10,000 time steps and 200 updating cycles per time step. The 
capacities of the 100 agents were evenly spaced from   0.5 to  + 0.5. The bin sizes of the 
prices and costs are both 0.02. 
The standard deviations of both distributions for a given value of the capacity change 
with the capacity. For the price distribution in the consumer regime, it decreases with the 
capacity from 0.25 to 0.15. In the balanced regime, it decreases with the capacity from 0.15 to 
0.05 and then rises to 0.1. In the excess producer regime, it stays around 0.1. For the cost 
distribution in the consumer regime, it decreases with the capacity from 0.016 to 0.004. In the 
balanced regime, it increases with the capacity from 0.004 to 0.012. In the excess producer 
regime, it stays around 0.012. 
Simulations in Fig. 3(B) were done with N = 100, 50 samples,  = 0.01, 10,000 time 
steps (the first 5,000 steps were used for equilibration) and 200 updating cycles per time step. 
The capacities of the 100 agents were evenly spaced from   0.5 to  + 0.5. The standard 
error of the mean prices remains below 0.04. 
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1. Green’s Function Approach to the Trading Model 
First, consider the cost function of node i, 
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determining the expenditure and revenue, respectively. When there is price adjustment i, Ei is 
changed by 
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Consequently, the demand of i changes because its neighbors j adjust their fractions of resource 
purchased from node i due to i. Furthermore, there are reaction effects due to the adjustment of 
the demands of the neighbors j, j, and hence the change i is 
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In turn, the change of the demands j is given by a similar equation, except that there is no 
driving term due to the adjustment of the resource fractions, 
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Note that the demands of j involve those of nodes k that are the second neighbors of i. The series 
of demand equations can be written, each time involving a new generation of neighbors one step 
further away. Hence, it is convenient to introduce Green’s functions given by 
.jkjk G             (S5) 
Substituting into Eq. (S4), we have 
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where  jjk kjkj rff    '' . This yields a recursion relation of the Green’s functions given by 
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This expression can be generalized to any pair of neighbors. Furthermore, we can write the 
Green’s function from i to itself. From Eq. (S3), 
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Hence we can write 
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where Gi is given by 
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To complete the description, we substitute the above expression back to Eq. (S2) to 
obtain the equation for the optimal price, 
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By setting 0/  iiE   and noting that ijijiji rrr  )1(  , we arrive at an equation for the 
optimal price, 
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For networks with connectivity of the order c, rji ~ c
-1
. Hence we can see from Eq. (S7) that Gji ~ 
c
-1
, and from Eq. (S10) that Gi  fi’. We then obtain 
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This is identical to Eq. (6) in the main text in the limit of a fully connected network, that is, the 
reaction effects embodied in the Green’s functions Gji are negligible in this limit. 
 
2. Small v Expansion 
 
In the full connectivity limit, Eq. (S13) can be further simplified. Since rji ~ O(N
-1
), the first term 
on the right hand side reduces to 1. The second term depends on two macroscopic parameters. 
First, we have 
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Hence the demand coefficient is given by 
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Second, we have the average purchasing price given by 
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This reduces i in Eq. (S13) to the solution of 
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Since 
1)]/exp(1[)('  vxxf , it is convenient to invert the functional relationship between  
and , yielding 
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To derive expressions for y and p, it is difficult to write the small v expansion due to their 
implicit dependence of v. We turn to consider the explicit integrals to achieve this. For e, we 
write it as an area integral in the space of  and , 
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where a and b are the lower and upper bounds of the capacity distribution respectively. As 
shown in the Fig. S1, interchanging the order of integrating  and   yields 
 
 
















)(
)(
)( )(
).()(
a
b
a
a
b
b
deddede



 
      (S20) 
 
 
4 
 
 
Fig. S1. The area of integration in Eqs. (S19) and (S20). 
 
 
For the rectangular distribution with a =   1/2 and b =  + 1/2, we have 
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In the small v limit and when the average capacity  is of the order v0, (a)  1 + p and (b)  
1. Hence, after integration, we have 
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Similarly, we can write 
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After integration, 
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For , we note that the expression appropriate for small v expansion is 
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From Eq. (S18), 0)( ye  when 2/1 p  . Thus, we have the integral expression 
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Substituting Eq. (S18), we have 
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Expressing  as area integrals, 
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Interchanging the order of integrating  and   yields 
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For the rectangular distribution we have 
 
   
22
)(
2
2
2
)(
2/1
)(
2/1
2/1 a
e
y
ayeyedyeyed pp
p
p
a
a











 




   
   














p
p
p
p
a
a
aye
v
dye
v
d










1
)(
2/1
)(
2/1
2/1
1
)(
1
 
   .
1
)(
1
)(
1
2/1
2/1
)(
2/1














b
pb p
p
p
p yeb
v
dye
v
d








    (S30) 
 
In the small v limit, the integrals ranging from (a) to 1 + p and from 1 to (b) are negligible. 
After integration, one obtains 
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After obtaining the expressions e, e and  in Eqs. (S22), (S24) and (S31) 
respectively, we substitute them into the self-consistent equations for p and y in Eqs. (S16) and 
(S15), yielding 
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3. The v = 0 Limit 
 
In the limit v = 0, Eqs. (S32) and (S33) reduce to 
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The solution of the quadratic equation for ye
1
 is 
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When  approaches 1/2, all nodes of the network have non-negative capacities, and the 
demand coefficient is expected to vanish. Hence the other solution 
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discarded. 
Note that Eq. (S36) implies ye
1
  1/2 + . This means that excess producers exist in 
the range implies ye
1
    1/2 + . When  approaches 0, the lower bound of the capacities 
of the excess producers, distribution, ye
1
, approaches the upper bound of the capacity 
distribution, 1/2 + . Hence the fraction of excess producers in the network approaches 0. 
However, for finite , excess producers always exist in the limit of v = 0. 
 
 Before the price diverges, it will approach a finite value c given by Eq. (S34) at  = 0, 
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This yields c = 1.83 with an infinite slope at  = 0, as shown in Fig. S2. The corresponding 
demand coefficient is yc = e/2. When  falls below 0, the price diverges discontinuously. 
However, as we shall see, this discontinuity is absent when we consider the behavior at small 
values. 
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Fig. S2. Price without inventory. The dependence of the purchasing price on the average capacity in the v = 0 limit. 
 
 
4. The Small v Limit 
 
 When v is finite but small, correction terms in Eq. (S33) have to be included, yielding the 
quadratic equation 
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The solution of Eq. (S38) is given by 
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Solution exists when   Jv. No solution will imply that there are no excess producers in the 
network. Hence, the critical capacity for the existence of excess producers is given by 
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The numerical result is c/v = 0.622. 
 
 
5. The Regime of No Excess Producers 
 
In this regime, the expressions e, e and  have to be modified. In particular, in 
the limit of small v, (b) is no longer equal to 1. Instead, we have (b)  ln(y/b). Hence, the 
expression for e is replaced by 
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After integration in the limit of small , 
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Similarly for e, Eq. (S24) is replaced by 
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After integration, 
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For , Eq. (S31) is replaced by 
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Noting that only terms of order v are modified, the result is 
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Hence, in the regime of no excess producers, we have to use the replaced Eqs. (S43), (S45) and 
(S47) for expressing e, e and  respectively, and the self-consistent equations (S32) and 
(S34) are thus replaced by 
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In the limit of small v and  ~ v, Eq. (S48) reduces to 
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Let x = 1 + p  ln(2y). Then x satisfies Eq. (S37). This implies 
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Hence for a given price p, we can find the corresponding value of y. Substituting p and y into 
Eq. (S49), we can obtain the corresponding value of /v directly. 
 
 
6. The Regime of No Quasi Producers 
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 Even in the regime of no excess producers, there are quasi producers whose resource lies 
between 
2/1 pye

 and b, and whose price is set between ln(y/b) and 1 + p/2. Their capacities are 
higher than their out-currents by order v. When /v drops sufficiently, 
2/1 pye

 approaches 1/2 
and even the quasi producers disappear. Substituting this condition into Eq. (S51), we find 
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This transition takes place when the price becomes 3.67, /v becomes 0.171, and y becomes 
4.25. 
 
 When /v falls below 0.171, e and e still follow Eqs. (S43) and (S5), but  in 
Eq. (S47) is replaced by 
 
  .
1
)(
22
)(
1
)/ln(
22
1
1
)/ln(























p
p
p
byby
b
dv
ab
yedbyed







  (S53) 
 
After integration, 
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Equation (S49) is replaced by 
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Noting that the lower integration limit is equal to 1 + s  c, we find in the limit of /v 
approaching 0, the price diverges as 
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7. A Possible Mechanism for the Yield Point 
  
So far we have assumed that the commodities are essential. However, when prices are too 
high, some agents cannot afford to purchase all the commodities they need. This provides one 
possible mechanism for the occurrence of the yield point. To analyze the situation, we consider 
the case that the capital of the consumers is finite and equal to C0. Due to their limited capital, a 
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fraction of consumers with the largest consumption will purchase less commodities and their 
capacity will be effectively replaced by a more positive capacity 0. 
 
These agents purchase commodities of the amount 
0
1

 pye

 at the price p, and sell 
commodities of the amount pye
1
 at the price 1 + p. Hence 0 is given by 
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implying 
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The self-consistent equations for p and y can then be derived, using the capacity distribution in 
which those capacities lying between a and 0 are now replaced by 0. Assume that the yield 
point lies in the regime of no excess producers. Then the expressions for e and e remain 
identical to Eqs. (S43) and (S45) respectively. On the other hand, the equation for  becomes 
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The self-consistent equation for p remains the same as Eq. (S51), whereas the self-consistent 
equation for y becomes 
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This equation differs from Eq. (S49) only in the last term, showing that when 
),(2/1~0 vO  there will be a significant change in the solution. This change takes place 
when y and p are related via Eq. (S58) by 
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Eliminating y from Eq. (S51), 
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Hence when the price reaches this level, the price will be pinned when the average capacity 
continues to decrease according to Eq. (S60). The elasticity dp/d will drop discontinuously 
to 0. 
 
8. Elasticity Curves of Agricultural Products, Metals and Other Commodities 
 
 In this section we first describe how the rescaled elasticity curves in Figs.4, 5 and S3 are 
constructed. Then we analyze other commodities not mentioned in the main text such as cereal, 
crude oil and carbon trading. 
 
A. Elasticity Curves 
 
Elasticity curves in Figs. 4 and S3 are constructed by first performing a linear regression 
of the data points. The x intercept of the regression line is then taken to be turning point, thus 
fixing the SUR scale. We then rescale the elasticities by the elasticity scale, and define the cost 
function to be the mean square difference between the rescaled empirical elasticities and their 
theoretical predicted values. The cost function is minimized with respect to the elasticity scale. 
 
Elasticity curves in Figs. 5(A)-(H) are constructed with additional procedures since the 
data points are noisier and the elasticity curves need to be fitted to the three regimes (inelastic, 
elastic and yield). First, we propose that the elasticity of a commodity is the sum of its value in 
the elastic regime (as described by the curve in Fig. 1(B) inset) and a non-negative background 
elasticity Eback. As shown in Fig. 1(B), p approaches an effectively constant value (= 1.83) when 
 >> v, but as indicated in Fig. S2 of SM, p continues to drops gently when  increases to 
the order of v
0
. This gentle drop may give rise to the background elasticity. We then define a cost 
function that is proportional to the mean square difference between the rescaled empirical 
elasticities and their theoretical predicted values. Only those data points considered to be in the 
inelastic and elastic regimes are included in the cost function, which is minimized with respect to 
the SUR scale SSUR, the elasticity scale SE and Eback. To prevent the overflow of the elasticity 
scale or the underflow of SUR scale, the proportionality constant in the cost function is SE
n
 / 
SSUR, where n = 2 for all metals (except for sulfur where n = 1). 
 
To determine the range of data points in the inelastic and elastic regimes, we successively 
expand the range into the yielded regime. When the range does not include data points in the 
yielded regime, the cost function per data point is roughly constant. However, when the range 
starts to cover the yielded regime, the cost function per data point starts to increase sharply, or 
may even diverge. This provides a clear-cut criterion to demarcate the yielded regime. 
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A. Cereal 
 
Cereal data are available from the UN FAO yearly food outlooks [22]. These reports 
provided global annual average prices and major exporters’ SUR for different commodities, such 
as wheat, coarse grains and rice. Although data from 1992 to 2012 are available, the data show a 
discontinuity in the SUR from 1995 to 1996. According to the report from February 2001, the 
discontinuity was due to significant data changes when the cereal stocks estimates in China 
(Mainland) were revised [22]. Hence we focus on wheat and coarse grains data from 1991 to 
2010 excluding 1995 for the elasticity versus SUR plot. As shown in Figs. S3(A)-(B), both wheat 
and coarse grains data follow the trend predicted by our model in the elastic regime. 
 
Fig. S3. Elasticity of cereal. The rescaled elasticity versus the rescaled SUR for (A) wheat, (B) coarse grains, both 
from 1991 to 2012 and excluding 1995. To enable comparison with the trading model (the solid curve with a turning 
point at 0.622), the elasticities and SURs are rescaled by (A) 448 US$@1998/tonne/y and 0.684 y, (B) 223 
US$@1998/tonne/y and 0.563 y. Each plotted point comes from a regression of 7 data points. 
 
B. Crude Oil 
 
We collect SUR and price data of crude oil from OPEC Monthly Oil Market Reports 
[23]. Since oil usage has seasonal variations, we consider data averaged over four consecutive 
quarters. The plot of the price is shown in the inset of Fig. S4(A). It shows the general trend of 
increasing price on decreasing SUR. By plotting the elasticity in Fig. S4(A), we find that the 
elasticity is positive and rather constant. This shows that besides the market factors considered in 
our model, there may be additional factors such as the efforts of OPEC countries in trying to 
control prices by regulating production quota [24]. 
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Fig. S4. Elasticity of crude oil and carbon trading. (A) The elasticity (in US$@Jun01/barrel/mbpd) versus the 
SUR of crude oil from 1st quarter of 2007 to 2nd quarter of 2015. 1 mbpd is equal to 1 million barrels per day. Each 
data point is based on the average of the considered quarter and three subsequent quarters. Each plotted point 
represents a regression of 11 data points. Inset: Basket crude oil prices in US\$@Jun01 per barrel versus SUR. (B) 
The price of carbon permits in Euros per tonne of carbon dioxide versus SUR from 2009 to 2012. 
 
C. Carbon Trading 
 
We further studied carbon trading in the European Union Emission Trading System [25]. 
EU-wide carbon permit prices can be obtained from the French stock exchange up to 2012 [26]. 
Daily prices are averaged annually. The SUR of carbon trading is defined as the EU-wide carbon 
emission allocation minus the actual release, divided by the actual release. In contrast with other 
physical commodities, negative SURs are allowed for carbon trading, but penalty was imposed 
on non-compliance. In practice, a negative SUR was only found for the years 2008 when carbon 
trading entered phase 2. Figure S4(B) shows that the price decreases with increasing SUR. Since 
data points are too few, we have not attempted the elasticity plot. 
 
 
